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STATE OF UTAH, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Case No.· 
14710 
-vs-
DON C. COFFEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of issuing 
a bad check in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-505 
(Supp. 1975). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury which 
returned a verdict of guilty. The Honorable Allen B. 
Sorenson entered judgment on that verdict, and sentenced 
appellant to an indeterminate term of not less than one 
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an Order of this Court affirming 
the judgment rendered below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 29, 1975, appellant negotiated with 
W. Morris Ercanbrack for the sale of a load of cherries. 
A deal was closed, and appellant paid for the cherries 
by a check in the amount of $3,560.00 drawn on the Dixie 
State Bank. Both Mr. Ercanbrack and his son Randall 
testified that appellant represented the check as good 
at the time it was written (Tr:~l2,15).. The check was 
not post-dated. Appellant did not have at the time 
the check was written sufficient funds to cover the 
check (Tr. 6),. Mr • Ercanbrack has never received 
payment in full on the check (Tr~lO). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH ALL ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (Supp. 1975) pro-
vides that:·'.\ 
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"Any person who issues or passes 
a check for • • • the purpose of 
obtaining from any person • • • 
any money, property or other thing 
of value. • • knowing it will not 
~e paid by the drawee and payment 
is refused by the drawee, is guilty 
of issuing a bad check." 
It is undisputed that the evidence establishes the 
issuing of a check for the purpose of obtaining property, 
and the non-payment of the check by the drawee. The 
nub of the case is the sufficiency of the evidence to 
establish the culpable mental state of the appellant. 
It is clear from the above-quoted statute what culpable 
mental state must be established~ knowledge that the 
check will not be paid by the drawee. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-103(2) (Supp. 1975) provides that: 
"A person acts knowingly. 
with respect to a result of his 
conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to 
cause the result." 
If the evidence establishes that appellant was aware 
that it was reasonably certain that his check would not 
be paid by the drawee, the State will have met its 
burden to establish all the elements of the offense. 
In Points I and II of appellant's brief, it is 
suggested that the State must prove both an "intent to 
defraud" and a knowledge that the check would not be paid. 
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If the intent to defraud is interpreted to mean some-
thing different from, or in addition to the know-
ledge that the check would not be paid, it is not' an 
element of the offense and the State has no obligation 
to prove it. However, if a person obtains an item of 
value from a person by means of a check that he 
knows will not be paid, he manifests an intent to 
deprive another of right, i.e. to procure something 
by deception or artifice or to appropriate wrongfully. 
In other words, he would manifest an intent to defraud. 
People v. Griffith, 120 C.A.2d 873, 262 P.2d 355 
1(1953). Under the facts of this case, therefore, proof 
of a knowledge that the check would not be paid is 
also proof of an intent to defraud. 
Appellant contends that the evidence is 
such that no reasonable juror could find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that appellant possessed the requisite 
knowledge, and in support of his argument has 
invoked a maxim of statutory construction, inclusio 
unius est exclusio. The maxim, however, has no application 
to the case. 
Appellant is correct in his interpretation 
of the present bad check statute. It provides for no 
presumption of knowledge fr.om the issuing of an insufficient 
funds check. However, the fact that such a presumption 
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is not included in the statute does not exclude the 
jury from inferring intent from appellant's acts. 
The Utah Criminal Code provides for very few 
evidentiary presumptions, and yet nearly every offense 
is defined to include a culpable mental state as 
an element. Direct evidence on the mental state 
of a criminal defendant is rarely available, and 
consequently the jury must nearly always infer the 
defendant's intent from his acts. The legislature's 
failure to include presumptions in the code cannot be 
interpreted as an attempt to prevent the jury from 
inferring intent. Such a construction would largely 
frustrate the purposes of the Criminal Code. 
On appeal, this court will view the evidence,. 
and the inferences to be fairly drawn therefrom, in 
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State 
v. Schad, 24 U.2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970). The un-
disputed facts of this case are that appellant issued 
a check for a substantial amount of money.{ and represented 
that the check was good at the time it was issued. In 
fact, appellant did not have sufficient funds or 
credit with the bank on that date, and Mr. Ercanbrack 
was unable to collect on the check despite a one month 
effort to do so {Tr .10). At the time of trial, nearly 
one year after the event, Mr. Ercanbrack had still not 
~ved full payment {Tr.12). 
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On these facts, a reasonable jury would not 
necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt of appellant's 
knowledge that the check would bounce. On the contrary, 
the inference that he knew seems inescapable. A 
number of statutes provide that a presumption of intent 
to defraud arises from the issuing of an insufficient 
funds check. Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-2, 1953, as 
amended (Utah statute governing civil remedies for 
bad checks); Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-11, 1953, as 
amended (Repealed Utah Criminal Code); Model Penal 
Code .§224.5 (1962); and California Penal Code 
§ 476a(c) (1970). The legislatures could not provide 
for such presumptions unless the presumption had some basis 
in fact. If the legislatures can provide that the 
issuance of an insufficient funds check gives rise 
to a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of 
funds, a fortiori a jury can infer from the passing of 
a particular bad check that an issuer had knowledge 
of the insufficiency of funds. 
Respondent submits that the evidence in this 
case establishes appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and in the interest of justice, asks that the 
judgment be affirmed. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS FULLY, FAIRLY 
AND CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE ELEMENTS' OF THE 
CRIME, AND WERE NEITHER CONFUSING NOR CONTRADICTORY. 
The premise of appellant's Point III on appeal 
is that intent to defraud is different and distinguish-
able from knowledge that a check will not be paid by 
the drawee. As noted in Point I, supra, under the 
' facts of this case, proof · of knowledge that the clleck 
would not pass is equivalent to proof of intent to 
defraud. Instruction No. 6 is clearly a proper 
instruction on the elements of the crime because 
it is cast in terms of the statute. Instruction Mo. S 
is not distiiig~ishable from No. 6 except that it uses the 
term •intent to defraud". No jury would find appellant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of having an intent 
to defraud if they felt that appellant thought that 
his check would pass. Such knowledge would be clearly 
inconsistent with a fraudulent intent. The instructions, 
considered as a whole, fully and fairly explain the 
elements of the offense of issuing a bad dheck. 
Because Instructions Nos. 5 and 6 are reconcilable 
and harmonious, they cannot be considered contradictory 
or confusing. As this court stated in State v. Hendricks, 
123 Utah 267, 258 P.2d 452 (1953), instructions are to. 
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be considered as a whole and reconciled whenever 
possible. It is only when instructions are hopelessly 
in conflict that it can be said that a jury was 
misled or confused. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the guilty verdict 
was rendered by a properly instructed jury in 
accordance with evidence. Respondent asks that in 
the interests of justice the judgment be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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